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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION’S CONTRIBUTION
ANDREW D. MITCHELL* AND ELIZABETH SHEARGOLD** 
Democracy and administrative law concern ideas
of governance, legitimacy, and accountability. With the
growth of bureaucracy and regulation, many
democratic theorists would argue that administrative
law mechanisms are essential to achieving democratic
objectives. This article considers the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) contribution to governance
both in terms of global administrative law and
democracy. In relation to administrative law, it first
explores the extent to which the WTO’s own dispute
settlement process contributes to this area. Second, it
considers the operation of administrative law
principles embedded within the WTO Agreements on
Members. For example, the WTO Agreements require
that certain laws be administered “in a uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner.” This obligation
was recently considered by the Appellate Body, but
uncertainty remains about the scope this provision has
to permit WTO panels to review domestic
administrative practices. In relation to the WTO’s
contribution to democracy, this article first considers
the challenges and limitations of the current system of
decision making within the WTO and compares it to
democratic theory. Second, it examines how
democracies comply with the findings of WTO dispute
settlement tribunals and how compliance could be
improved. It concludes by speculating on the
implications of this discussion for public international
law more broadly.
La démocratie et le droit administratif concernent
des idées de gouvernance, de légitimité et de
responsabilité. Compte tenu de la croissance de la
bureaucratie et de la réglementation, de nombreux
théoriciens de la démocratie feraient valoir que les
mécanismes du droit administratif sont essentiels pour
réaliser les objectifs démocratiques. Cet article
examine la contribution de l’Organisation mondiale du
commerce (OMC) à la gouvernance à la fois en termes
de droit administratif et de démocratie à l’échelle
mondiale. Par rapport au droit administratif, les
auteurs explorent d’abord la mesure dans laquelle la
méthode de règlement de conflit propre à l’OMC y
contribue. Ensuite, ils examinent le fonctionnement des
principes du droit administratif ancrés dans l’Accord
instituant l’organisation mondiale du commerce. Par
exemple, l’Accord exige que certaines lois soient
appliquées « de manière uniforme, impartiale et
raisonnable ». Dernièrement, cette obligation a été
examinée par l’Organe d’appel, mais il y a encore de
l’incertitude quant à la mesure dans laquelle cette
disposition permet aux groupes d’experts de l’OMC de
revoir les pratiques administratives intérieures d’un
pays. En ce qui concerne la contribution de l’OMC à
la démocratie, les auteurs examinent d’abord les défis
et les limitations du système actuel de prise de décision
au sein de l’OMC et le comparent à la théorie
démocratique. Puis, ils examinent de quelle manière
les démocraties respectent les conclusions des
tribunaux de règlement de conflits de l’OMC et de
quelle manière il serait possible d’améliorer la
conformité. Les auteurs concluent en réfléchissant aux
implications de cette discussion sur le droit public
international au sens plus large.
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I.  INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE WTO
Global governance has traditionally focused on the management of public international
affairs through formal and informal interactions between states. Over the course of the last
century, however, the globalization of an increasing number of socio-economic and
environmental problems and improvements in technology have blurred the boundaries
between public and private, and domestic and international. The focus of global governance
has broadened significantly to include more diverse actors, institutions, networks, regimes,
and mechanisms that exercise regulatory or distributive functions having transnational
impacts. Thus, James Rosenau argues that global governance now “encompasses the
activities of governments, but it also includes the many other channels through which
‘commands’ flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and policies pursued,”
where such exercises of control have transnational repercussions.1
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has evolved parallel to these fundamental shifts
in how global governance is ordered. Although the WTO is an intergovernmental
organization that is ultimately responsible to, and in many respects regularly influenced by,
its members, it is appropriate to consider the role of the WTO in light of this more complex
understanding of global governance. For instance, decision-making, administration,
enforcement, and management tasks within the WTO are undertaken by a range of state and
non-state actors using a variety of different mechanisms, many of which do not conform to
more traditional understandings of governance, domestic or international.
In line with the increasing importance and complexity of global governance mechanisms,
there has been significant controversy regarding the extent to which global governance is
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2 See e.g. Philip Alston, “The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization”
(1997) 8 E.J.I.L. 435; John Glenn, “Global Governance and the Democratic Deficit: Stifling the Voice
of the South” (2008) 29 Third World Quarterly 217; Sebastian Mallaby, “Big Nongovernment”
Washington Post (30 November 1999) A29; Phillip R. Trimble, “Globalization, International
Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy” (1997) 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1944.
3 See e.g. B.S. Chimni, “The World Trade Organization, Democracy and Development: A View From the
South” (2006) 40 J. World Trade 5; Ralph Nader, “WTO Means Rule by Unaccountable Tribunals” Wall
Street Journal (17 August 1994) A12; cf. “Who Elected the WTO?” The Economist 360:8241 (29
September 2001) 26; James Bacchus, “A Few Thoughts on Legitimacy, Democracy, and the WTO”
(2004) 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 667.
4 See e.g. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, “The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law” (2005) 68:3 Law & Contemp. Probs. 15.
5 See e.g. Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, “Making International Organizations More Democratic” (2005)
1 Review of Law and Economics 305.
6 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 4 at 28.
7 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 12; Alfred
C. Aman, Jr., “The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: From Government
to Governance” (2001) 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 379; Martin Shapiro, “Administrative Law
Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance” (2001) 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 369.
legitimate and accountable.2 The WTO has often been at the heart of these legitimacy and
accountability debates.3
Two growing bodies of scholarly literature have emerged focusing on enhancing global
governance. The first of these examines how global governance is improved through the
adoption of administrative law-type mechanisms.4 The second focuses on analyzing and
identifying ways of managing democratic deficits.5 This article aims to contribute to these
two bodies of literature by identifying and analyzing a number of WTO activities, rules, and
processes that have played a role in the development of global governance in this way.
To this end, Part II of this article assesses the WTO’s contribution to global administrative
law, both in terms of rules that apply internally to its dispute settlement process and those
that have been imposed externally on members. Part III then considers the extent to which
the WTO has added to our understanding how democracy should be conceptualized at a
global level, with reference to both the decision-making processes in place in the WTO and
the WTO’s adjudication of disputes.
II.  THE WTO AND GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Global governance, like domestic governance, necessarily involves regulatory and
administrative decision-making. “Global administrative law” refers to the rules, procedures,
and systematized norms that control this decision-making, particularly mechanisms that
promote principles such as accountability, transparency, and legitimacy.6 As foreshadowed
above, global regulatory practices are blurring the traditional bright line distinctions between
public/private, and national/international bodies, underpinned and supported by a perceptible
shift towards a disaggregated system of governance rather than bounded government.7
“Bounded government” in a Lockean sense refers to government limited by laws in contrast
4 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2009) 46:4
8 Ian Harris, “Locke’s Political Theory” in Stuart Brown, ed., British Philosophy and the Age of
Enlightenment (London: Routledge, 1996) 96 at 99.
9 See Shapiro, supra note 7 at 369.
10 See generally Stutzer & Frey, supra note 5.
11 See generally, Benedict Kingsbury, “The Administrative Law Frontier in Global Governance” (2005)
99 American Society of International Law Proceedings 143.
12 See Eleanor Kinney, “The Emerging Field of International Administrative Law: Its Content and
Potential” (2002) 54 Admin. L. Rev. 415 at 416-17; Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 4 at 15.
13 For a detailed analysis of the distinction between prototypical administrative law procedural
requirements and general public law values see Carol Harlow, “Global Administrative Law: The Quest
for Principles and Values” (2006) 17 E.J.I.L. 187 at 194.
14 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 4 at 29.
15 Ibid. at 37.
16 Harlow, supra note 13 at 208.
to “absolutism.”8 However, here we use “bounded government” to refer to the idea of a clear
separation between, on the one hand, government and administration, and on the other,
citizens and the administered.9 The clear delinations envisaged by this concept of bounded
government have been challenged by the increasing involvement of non-governmental
organizations, interest groups, private sector experts, “epistemic communities,” and
“networks” in administrative decision-making. This, in turn, demands that classical notions
of accountability, democratic legitimacy, and legality of administrative decision-making be
reconceptualized at both a practical and theoretical level in order to operate globally. This
reconceptualization is necessary to the extent that these classical notions have been
developed under a very different model of administration; one that focuses on the regulatory
activities of “bounded” public government agencies operating within a single unified nation-
state. Such a reconceptualization is made all the more necessary since, as has already been
suggested, regulatory actors such as the WTO are increasingly encountering questions and
concerns as to their legitimacy and accountability.10 These concerns pose a critical threat to
the efficacy and democratic validity of the WTO and other transnational regulatory actors.
To combat this “democracy deficit,” administrative law-type mechanisms, procedures,
rules, and principles have begun to emerge, or have been purposefully woven into the fabric
of a variety of bodies, both formal and informal, in the global administrative space.11 These
developments form the foundation of “global administrative law.” Despite not being
presently systemically understood and somewhat fragmented as a body of law, some have
suggested that core principles are emerging within global administrative law.12 These include
a mixture of both classical administrative law conceptions of fair and legal decision-making
and review procedures, and also more substantive, albeit nebulous, “public law” or “good
governance” values.13 Together these principles include: procedural participation and
transparency; reasoned decisions; access to review mechanisms; proportionality and
reasonableness; avoidance of unnecessarily restrictive means; and legitimate expectations.14
This is not suggested as an exhaustive list, but rather a set of potential candidates for general
principles15 as reflected in the practice of a presently disjointed, but nevertheless growing
body of administrative law-type mechanisms.
The fact that these principles are linked to a transnational model of global governance
rather than domestic government distinguishes them conceptually from their equivalents in
the administrative and constitutional jurisprudence of domestic legal systems.16 The
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18 Ibid. at 13.
19 Ibid. at 14.
20 Ibid. at 15.
21 This is the traditional account referred to in Shapiro, supra note 7 at 369.
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interrelationship of these principles to a transnational model of global governance is also
reflected in how these principles are implemented and realized in the practice of global
administration. The field of global governance is populated by a disparate collection of
regulatory entities amongst which the task of global regulation and administrative decision-
making is spread. In addition to this, the global administrative space has been said to be
characterized by a disaggregation of nation-states into collections of sub-state regulatory
actors that are increasingly networking across jurisdictions and national boundaries,17
forming a complex web of vertical and horizontal networks that are functioning alongside
more traditional treaty-based international organizations.
An example of a horizontal network of regulatory actors is the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision. This committee comprises the representatives of the central banks (or
other authorities with the formal responsibility of prudential supervision over the banking
business) of 13 countries. Its objective is to improve understanding of supervisory issues and
improve the quality of banking supervision. Examples of vertical networks are rarer, since
they presuppose that states have chosen to delegate a limited amount of their sovereignty to
a supranational institution.18 The clearest example of this occurring can be found in the
European Union (EU), where vertical networks can be seen in the interaction between the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the domestic courts of EU Members.19 This
“disaggregated world order”20 is a complex system of administrative regulation quite far
removed from classic domestic administration. A traditional understanding of administrative
law focused on national government agencies operating as domestic “organs of public
administration”21 subordinated to legislative and judicial oversight within the unified
framework of a nation-state and domestic legal order cannot be directly transplanted to the
global or transnational context. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that the task of providing a conceptual
framework to underpin global administrative law, is as yet, incomplete. In the absence of
such a framework, a functional definition of global administrative law may be posited as a
placeholder. “Global administrative law” is all the rules, procedures, and systematized norms
governing international regulation and administrative decision-making with special emphasis
placed on the mechanisms that impose accountability, transparency, and legal legitimacy on
global administrative decision-making.22 This classification not only covers the range of
specialized mechanisms developed for specific international organizations and other
transnational regulators, but also captures the ways in which domestic institutions and
domestic administrative law may operate as a check on or a forum for review of decision-
making by these organs of global governance.
The most important growth area for global administrative law in relation to these global
regimes is likely to be the creation of specialized administrative law-type mechanisms
6 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2009) 46:4
23 Richard B. Stewart, “U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?” (2005) 68:3
Law & Contemp. Probs. 63 at 71-72.
24 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (entered into force 1 January 1995) [DSU].
25 See especially ibid., art. 12.
26 Ibid., art. 10.
27 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at
7-8.
operating at the global level and directed towards improving the transparency, opportunities
for public participation, accountability, and thereby legitimacy, of transnational regulatory
decision-making. Global administrative law ought to be, and has been, developed so as to
provide the necessary checks and balances on transnational regulatory actors such as the
WTO. This helps to ensure accountability, legitimacy, and the promotion of a sense of
democratic participation and transparency in the development of global norms and
regulations.
This article will consider the simultaneous “top down” and “bottom up” administrative
law-type practices that are developing in the WTO and the contribution that they make.
Richard Stewart categorizes “top down” administrative law mechanisms as those that
originate in the international institution itself, while “bottom up” measures are those that
stem from the domestic administrative law systems of the institution’s members.23 First, we
examine how the incorporation of administrative law principles in WTO Agreements has
impacted upon domestic administrative procedures. Second, we turn to the incorporation of
administrative law principles, such as due process, in WTO Agreements and the impact that
this has on administrative procedures within the WTO, particularly in dispute settlement.
Third, we examine the possibility for WTO dispute settlement to be considered as an extra
layer of judicial review of domestic administrative decision-making.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES WITHIN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
As discussed above, global administrative law, like domestic administrative law, goes
beyond administrative mechanisms and rules, and includes principles such as due process,
fairness, procedural participation, and transparency. The WTO contributes to the
development of many of these principles at the global level as they are often included in the
provisions of the WTO Agreements, such as the Understanding on Rules and Proceudres
Governing the Settlement of Disputes.24 Fairness is reflected in many articles of the DSU,
including the requirements regarding panel procedures25 and the granting of participatory
rights to third parties in disputes.26 Thus, the implementation and interpretation of the WTO
Agreements, such as these DSU provisions, adds to the development of global administrative
law principles (that is, principles that can be applied to international regulatory and
administrative decision-making).
One of the clearest examples of this is the development of the principle of due process
(also called fundamental fairness, procedural fairness, or natural justice), which essentially
requires administrative and judicial proceedings to be fair. Due process is a relevant principle
in both domestic and global administrative law, as it is a necessary component of any legal
system seeking legitimacy and effectiveness.27 Due process has been incorporated into the
WTO dispute settlement system through both a “top down” and a “bottom up” approach, and
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28 United States — Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (Complaint by the European
Communities) (2000), WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R at para. 166 (Appellate Body Report).
29 See generally Andrew Mitchell, “Due Process in WTO Disputes” in Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson, eds.,
Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 144.
30 Peter E. Nygh & Peter Butt, eds., Australian Legal Dictionary (Sydney: Butterworths, 1997) s.v. “bias
rule.”
31 DSU, supra note 24, art. 8(9).
32 Bryan Mercurio & Rebecca Laforgia, “Expanding Democracy: Why Australia Should Negotiate for
Open and Transparent Dispute Settlement in its Free Trade Agreements” (2005) 6 Melbourne J. Int’l L.
485 at 492-93.
33 DSU, supra note 24, arts. 14(1), 17(10).
34 Ibid., art. 18(2).
35 See online: Office of the United States Trade Representative <http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/
Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Section_Index.html>; online: European
Commission <http://ec. europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/dispute/index_en.htm>; WorldTradeLaw.net
provides links to other governments that make WTO dispute settlement submissions available, online:
WorldTradeLaw.net <http://www.world tradelaw.net/submissions.htm>.
36 See online: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/index.aspx?lang=en>.
we will consider each of these in turn as a case study of how the WTO dispute settlement
process is contributing to the development of global administrative law.
The WTO Appellate Body has said that the “procedural rules of WTO dispute settlement
are designed to promote … the fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade disputes.”28 The
DSU incorporates the principle of due process in a range of ways,29 such as imposing a form
of the bias rule. This rule precludes decision-makers from acting where there is a reasonable
apprehension by others that they may be biased, for example because they have an interest
in the outcome.30 For panels, the DSU requires that panellists be free of any actual or
perceived bias. Article 8(2) of the DSU states that panellists should be selected with a view
to ensuring their independence, and art. 8(3) states that citizens of members involved in the
dispute (as parties or third parties) should not serve as panellists unless the parties agree
otherwise. Article 8(9) states that “[p]anelists shall serve in their individual capacities” and
that members shall “not give them instructions nor seek to influence them as individuals with
regard to matters before a panel.”31 The explicit inclusion of these due process rules in the
DSU provides a model upon which other international institutions can base dispute settlement
systems.
This does not mean, however, that due process has been incorporated into the DSU in
exactly the same form, or to exactly the same extent as it exists in many domestic contexts.
There are some DSU provisions that appear to undermine transparency and due process,32
such as the confidentiality of panel deliberations and Appellate Body proceedings33 and the
confidentiality of submissions.34 These provisions deliberately prioritize the rights of
disputants over the rights of third parties, NGOs, corporations, and non-WTO members. This
reflects a desire by the treaty drafters to make the WTO a member-driven organization, with
its primary duty being the protection of its members’ interests through mechanisms such as
state-to-state dispute settlement. However, certain WTO members have recently been
successful in opening up WTO dispute settlement proceedings to the public. Members such
as the United States and the European Communities (EC) provide copies of their submissions
on government websites,35 while Canada makes their submissions available upon request.36
8 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2009) 46:4
37 United States — Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC — Hormones Dispute, Canada —
Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC — Hormones Dispute (2005), WTO Docs. WT/DS320/8,
WT/DS321/8 (Communication from the Chairman of the Panels) [EC — Hormones].
38 See WTO Dispute Settlement News, online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
public_hearing_july08_e.htm>. Subsequent Appellate Body hearings are also being opened to the
public, e.g. EC — Bananas (Article 21.5) held in October 2008, online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/news08_e/hearing_22sept08_e.htm>.
39 EC — Hormones, supra note 37.
40 Ibid.
41 Mercurio & Laforgia, supra note 32 at 514.
These members have also requested on certain occasions that both panel and Appellate Body
hearings be opened to the public through closed circuit television broadcast. The first such
hearings to be made public were part of the EC – Hormones dispute, when, in 2005, the EC
challenged both the U.S. and Canada’s continued suspension of concessions.37 In July 2008,
the Appellate Body hearing on the same matters was also made open to public viewing.38
While the DSU provisions state that panel deliberations and Appellate Body proceedings are
to be confidential, in the EC – Hormones dispute, the Chairman of the Panels stated that after
careful consideration of the existing provisions of the DSU, there was nothing prohibiting
proceedings from being made public where the parties consented, while third parties who did
not want their submissions to be public could participate in a closed hearing of the panel or
Appellate Body.39 Thus, WTO members have been able to strengthen due process in WTO
dispute settlement, with a “view to ensuring full transparency and non-discriminatory access”
to hearings.40 While not all WTO dispute settlement proceedings are now open to the public,
the opening of even a few cases sets a valuable precedent for dispute settlement in other
forums, such as bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements or customs unions.41
The incorporation of the principle of due process into WTO Agreements contributes to the
development of global administrative law through both “top down” and “bottom up”
approaches. Its inclusion in the DSU provides a model for how due process can be
incorporated into the rules of other dispute settlement systems, and reflects a “top down”
approach where the administrative law principles were imposed by the institution itself. In
contrast, the shift towards making some WTO dispute settlement proceedings open to the
public demonstrates a “bottom up” approach, where the administrative law principles (such
as transparency) that stem from members’ domestic legal systems have been be used to
influence an international institution – even when that institution initially adopted practices
that were directly contrary to these principles.
C. THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
ON DOMESTIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
While global administrative law is clearly shaped and influenced by domestic
administrative law, as it develops, this relationship will become increasingly reciprocal with
global administrative law requirements and norms having a greater impact on domestic
administrative systems. Several of the WTO Agreements also impose an obligation on WTO
members to afford due process within their domestic legal systems. This raises the possibility
of a significant challenge for global administrative law, namely the potential for conflicts to
arise when domestic and global administrative law impose conflicting procedural
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42 United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Complaint by Pakistan)
(1998), WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Appellate Body Report) [US — Shrimp].
43 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 4 at 36. 
44 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force 1 January 1948) [GATT]; for more detailed
discussion of the US — Shrimp decision, and its connection with “due process” as a principle of WTO
law, see Andrew D. Mitchell, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2008) at 173-75.
45 US — Shrimp, supra note 42 at para. 186.
46 Ibid. at para. 180.
47 United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Recourse to Article 21.5
of the DSU by Malaysia) (2001), WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW at para. 147 (Appellate Body Report).
48 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 4 at 36.
requirements or substantive principles. The imposition of obligations on members need not
involve direct prescription of administrative procedures for domestic legal systems by the
WTO Agreements; it is enough for a broad due process requirement to exist at the global
level alone where its satisfaction imposes domestic obligations. For example, in a decision
considering a U.S. import restriction on shrimp and certain shrimp-related products,42 the
WTO Appellate Body found that the application of the ban denied affected countries due
process43 and, consequently, the ban could not be justified under the chapeau requirements
found in art. XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.44 In order to be exempt
from the U.S. import ban, countries needed to have their imports “certified” as meeting
certain environmental standards imposed by the U.S. on its own shrimp trawlers. However,
the Appellate Body found that this certification process did not comply with the fundamental
requirements of due process and involved “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” within
the meaning of the chapeau of art. XX.45
While the Appellate Body did not prescribe the specific administrative procedures that had
to be implemented by the U.S. in order for the requirements under the chapeau of art. XX to
be met, it did highlight the absence of certain procedures as indicating a lack of due process:
[T]here is no formal opportunity for an applicant country to be heard, or to respond to any arguments that
may be made against it, in the course of the certification process before a decision to grant or to deny
certification is made. Moreover, no formal written, reasoned decision, whether of acceptance or rejection,
is rendered on applications.… No procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of an application is
provided.46 
In response to this finding, the U.S. redesigned its measure to be more flexible, for example
by providing that a “country that does not appear to qualify for certification will receive a
notification that ‘will explain the reasons for this preliminary assessment, suggest steps that
the government of the harvesting nation can take in order to receive a certification, and invite
the government of the harvesting nation to provide ... any further information.’”47 As a
consequence of its international law obligations to the WTO, the U.S. domestic
administrative procedure needed to be adjusted so as to provide the requisite degree of
procedural fairness to foreign states and affected producers.48 Despite the lack of a direct
effect of WTO law on U.S. law, its domestic administrative procedures were substantively
altered as a consequence of a WTO ruling. This provides a clear example of how
administrative law requirements being introduced at a global level can have significant
implications for domestic administrative law.
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Michael Lux, “The US Challenge to the EC Customs Union” (2007) 2 Global Trade and Customs
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54 EC — Customs Matters, Appellate Body, supra note 49 at para. 48.
55 GATT, supra note 44, art. X(3)(a).
D. CASE STUDY: THE APPELLATE BODY REPORT IN EC — CUSTOMS MATTERS
The broad scope of the potential impact that global administrative law could have in
domestic law can be seen in the report of the Appellate Body in European Communities —
Selected Customs Matters.49 The GATT requires that domestic laws relating to customs and
valuation of goods be administered in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.”50 This
provision goes beyond merely incorporating an administrative law principle into the WTO
Agreements; instead, it creates the potential for WTO panels to review a member’s domestic
administrative practices. This is also seen in art. X(3)(b), which states that each WTO
member shall maintain or create “judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures
for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of administrative action
relating to customs matters.”51 Both of these provisions were considered by the Appellate
Body in the EC — Customs Matters dispute. Although the Appellate Body report left
uncertainty regarding the scope of review of a WTO member’s domestic administrative
practices, it made some important contributions to the development of administrative law in
the WTO, and hence to global administrative law as a whole.
The Appellate Body addressed a large number of procedural issues of WTO law in this
case,52 but also some key substantive aspects of the GATT, art. X(3).53 Three of the Appellate
Body’s findings are particularly relevant to the development of global administrative law:
first, whether the substantive content of an administrative legal instrument may be challenged
as a form of administration; second whether art. X(3)(a) requires uniformity of administrative
processes leading to a particular decision; and third, its determination on the requirements
of art. X(3)(b).
1. CAN A SUBSTANTIVE INSTRUMENT BE WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
“ADMINISTER” FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE X(3)(a)?
The EC argued in EC — Customs Matters that laws and regulations themselves cannot be
challenged under art. X(3)(a) of the GATT and instead that only the administration of those
laws or regulations can be reviewed by a WTO panel.54 In earlier cases the Appellate Body
had emphasized that the requirement to be “uniform, impartial and reasonable”55 applied only
to the administration of laws and regulations, and not to the “substantive content” of the
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instruments themselves.56 Agreeing with the arguments of the EC, the Panel in EC —
Customs Matters held that the U.S. was unable to challenge EC regulations under art.
X(3)(a), and instead could challenge only the administration of those regulations.57 However,
on appeal, the U.S. successfully argued that, broadly speaking, there are two different
categories of laws and regulations — those that are “administrative in nature,” which can be
challenged in general under art. X(3)(a), and those that are not, which can be challenged
under art. X(3)(a) only with respect to their administration.58 The Appellate Body reasoned
that the text of art. X(3)(a) and its earlier decisions on the interpretation of that provision do
not exclude the possibility that a legal instrument regulating the administration of customs
laws can be challenged.59 In order to make out a claim of this kind, the burden was held to
lie with the complainant to demonstrate that the instrument “necessarily leads to a lack of
uniform, impartial, or reasonable administration.”60 In EC – Customs Matters, although the
Appellate Body found that the different penalty laws and audit procedures in place in the EC
were administrative measures, it considered that the U.S. had failed to discharge this burden
of proof.61
This Appellate Body finding raises important considerations for WTO members. While
the due process obligations under art. X(3)(a) may not seem to be an onerous requirement,
these sorts of administrative law principles are necessarily vague and difficult to define.
Moreover, it is a standard that numerous WTO members have not met in the past. By
deciding that this requirement can apply to laws and regulations that are administrative in
nature, the Appellate Body has embraced a broad interpretation of art. X(3)(a), meaning that
this requirement will apply to a greater range of domestic measures adopted or maintained
by WTO members. Thus, the Appellate Body’s decision in EC — Customs Matters
demonstrates the potential for international institutions to broadly interpret their power to
evaluate the adequacy of a member’s domestic administrative law systems.
2. ARE DIFFERENCES IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS COMMENSURATE 
WITH DIFFERENCES IN ADMINISTRATION?
In spite of this broadening of the scope of art. X(3)(a), difficulties remain in the
interpretation of the requirements it imposes. This can be seen in the Appellate Body’s
assessment of whether the “uniformity” requirement extends to administrative processes. The
Panel had held that the difference between the administrative process leading to the tariff
classification of blackout drapery lining in Germany and other EC members constituted non-
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68 GATT, supra note 44, art. X(3)(b).
uniform administration contrary to art. X(3)(a).62 However, the Appellate Body held that art.
X(3)(a) does not require that uniform administrative processes be adopted throughout the
territory of a member. Rather, it is the actual application of the law that must be uniform.63
The Appellate Body also noted that differences in administrative process can still constitute
evidence that the processes are applied in a manner that is not “uniform, impartial or
reasonable,” with the burden resting on the complainant to prove that the varied processes
lead or are likely to lead to administration of the law that is not uniform, impartial and
reasonable.64 The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding of a violation in connection
with the tariff classification of the drapery lining on the basis that this burden had not been
met.
The conclusion that art. X(3)(a) does not require uniformity of administrative processes,
however, sits uncomfortably with the Appellate Body’s construction of the term “administer”
as including administrative processes.65 On this interpretation of administration, it would
seem that differences in administrative processes must logically constitute differences in
administration. Nonetheless, the Appellate Body reasoned that administrative processes
potentially cover such a broad range of “steps, actions, or events” that art. X(3)(a) could not
be read as requiring them to be uniform.66 More problematic however, is that the Appellate
Body does not clearly explain the threshold differences in process that must be demonstrated
before they will be deemed to “have caused” or be “likely to cause”67 non-uniformity of
administration. That this issue was not addressed in the Appellate Body’s report appears to
reflect the difficulty of applying administrative principles to WTO members, particularly in
the case of the EC where WTO obligations are ultimately executed by subsidiary, national
bodies.
3. WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE X(3)(b)?
The third particularly notable aspect of the Appellate Body decision in EC – Customs
Matters relates to the U.S. claim under art. X(3)(b) of the GATT. The administrative
decisions of EC customs officials are reviewed at first instance under the domestic
administrative law of the relevant EC member (a system of territorially restricted judicial
review), and the resulting decisions have binding or precedential value only within the
territory of that EC member. The U.S. claimed that this system of territorially restricted
judicial review violates the requirements of art. X(3)(b), arguing that the use of the term “the
agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement”68 in the plural indicates that the
decisions of a member’s judicial, arbitral, and administrative tribunals must govern the
practice of all agencies responsible for enforcing the relevant laws. The Appellate Body
rejected this claim, finding that there were a number of possible explanations for the
reference to “agencies” in the plural in the provision. Further, they held that the use of the
terms “tribunals” and “procedures” in the plural in fact indicates that WTO members may
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establish a number of tribunals within their territory having different substantive or
geographic areas of competence.69 Of itself, this finding may not have particular significance
for the development of global administrative law as it focuses on the interpretation of the
terms in art. X(3)(b). However, it clearly demonstrates that WTO panels and the Appellate
Body are prepared to adjudicate on whether or not domestic administrative procedures meet
the requirements of art. X(3)(b). While they took an approach in EC – Customs Matters that
was quite deferential to the domestic systems operating in the EC, future adjudications
concerning this provision could have a very significant impact on global administrative law.
In a disaggregated world order, intergovernmental organizations and government networks
are relying on domestic agencies, which typically boast superior coercive power, to
administer an increasing number of international rules.70 Accordingly, future cases
concerning this provision — for example, a challenge that a member’s domestic
administrative review mechanisms do not meet the art. X(3)(b) requirement of independence
— provide enormous and significant potential for the development of global administrative
law, as judicial review is a powerful check on administrative power. The potential impact of
this provision and its interpretation in the global administrative space is particularly
significant for members where the independence of judicial review has been a significant
concern.71
Part II of this article has addressed the WTO’s contribution to the development of global
administrative law. Yet the development of global administrative rules, principles, and
systemized norms is not a goal in itself; it is a means of ensuring accountability,
transparency, and legitimacy. It is these broader goals of good governance that global
administrative law seeks to further. The next section of this article examines the role of the
WTO in contributing to the development of notions of “democracy” and good governance
in the international sphere.
III.  THE WTO’S CONTRIBUTION TO DEMOCRACY
In order to assess the WTO’s contribution to how democracy can be conceptualized and
implemented at the global level, we first need to consider the key elements of democratic
theory, particularly as they relate to global governance and international institutions. A range
of principles are associated with democratic systems of government, such as participation,
transparency, accountability, majority rule, liberty, representation, equality, and the rule of
law. These core characteristics of modern “liberal” democracies can be considered key tenets
of democratic theory that are applicable at both the domestic and international levels. The
most central feature of any democracy is that “government should be by the citizenry” and
with their consent, even if this, for practical reasons, mostly occurs through a system of
representative government.72 Democratic systems derive their very legitimacy from the fact
14 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2009) 46:4
73 Jan Aart Scholte, “Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance” (2002) 8 Global Governance
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Governance (Paris, 1919)” (2003) 10:1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 45.
74 For a detailed discussion of different democratic theories and international law, see Gerry J. Simpson,
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Yearbook of International Law 103.
75 José E. Alvarez, “Introducing the Themes” (2007) 38 V.U.W.L.R. 159 at 159.
76 See Sanford Levinson, “How the United States Constitution Contributes to the Democratic Deficit in
America” (2007) 55 Drake L. Rev. 859 at 860.
77 See e.g. Pascal Lamy, “Towards Global Governance?” (Master of Public Affairs Inaugural Lecture at
the Institut d’ Etudes Politiques de Paris, 21 October 2005), online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/
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Governance” (Malcolm Wiener Lecture at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, 1 November 2006), online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl47_e.
htm>. 
that they have the consent of the governed. Further, while in a representative democratic
system the majority rules, there also cannot be a tyranny of the majority — there must be
respect for rights, equality, and an effective rule of law. It is frequently argued that these
principles — government by consent and the rule of the majority being tempered by rights,
equality, and the effective rule of law — are lacking in global governance mechanisms, and
subsequently that there is a “crisis of democracy” at the international level.73
One of the most often repeated criticisms of international institutions and laws is that they
lack democratic legitimacy because government is not being conducted by the citizenry.74
In particular, compared to domestic democratic systems, at the international/global level,
there are “democratic deficits.”75 The concept of a “democratic deficit” is that an institution
or government that is ostensibly democratic is falling short of fulfilling key principles of
democracy.76 Most commonly in international law, the term is used when an organization is
believed to not adequately represent or reflect the will of its citizens. International institutions
such as the WTO are generally based on the principle of sovereign equality, with
membership open only to states. Assuming that all states act in the interests of the majority
of their population, this system is still seen to exclude minority groups within states and
NGOs from these institutions, but is also criticized as it denies individual people the direct
ability to consent (or not consent) to the laws and policies developed by these institutions.
Moreover, many smaller or less powerful states may not consent to the formation of laws that
bind them (or consent because of diplomatic or political pressures), or do not participate in
the processes that develop international norms or customs.
Whether the WTO undermines or supports democratic principles is a contested topic. The
current Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, has given a series of speeches promoting
the organization’s contribution to the development of global governance.77 Lamy argues that
the WTO, while not providing a perfect model, is playing a significant role in this area. The
WTO, he observes, provides a permanent forum for negotiations by member states and
conducts annual public fora and regular briefings for non-state parties. It also monitors
member behaviour through peer review programmes such as the WTO Trade Policy Review
Mechanism. Finally, he notes that the WTO provides a mechanism for adjudicating and
enforcing members’ rights and obligations. In contrast, a range of NGOs and other
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commentators argue that the WTO is fundamentally undermining democracy.78 This article
undertakes an objective examination of the contribution of the WTO to democracy at the
global level by first considering how decision-making in the WTO both embodies and
diverges from democratic theory. It will then go on to discuss the enforcement of WTO
dispute settlement decisions in democratic states, and how this affects democratic principles
in those states.
A. DECISION-MAKING IN THE WTO
The system of decision-making used in the negotiation of rules and treaties within the
WTO has two key features. First, decisions are made by the members, who are almost
entirely states,79 on the basis of one nation, one vote. This principle of sovereign equality is
the basis for most (but not all) classical international institutions. The second feature is
unique to the WTO – that is the use of consensus as the basis for all major decision-making.
This was the practice under the GATT, and was included in art. IX(1) of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.80 Both of these features are
significant in terms of democratic theory. We will address each feature in turn.
As outlined above, in order for a state to be considered democratic it must represent the
will of its citizenry. At the international level, the issue is, of course, who are the “citizens”
of global organizations? While states may be the formal members of the WTO, it is now
widely argued that the citizens of an international organization’s member states are also the
citizens of the organization.81 Thus, the ability of these individuals to participate in WTO
decision-making, including through civil society organizations such as NGOs or through
corporations, is a key element in its contribution to democracy. The fact that these citizens
have no legal right to participate in the negotiation of WTO Agreements is clearly a concern
in terms of the democratic legitimacy of the WTO. Lamy argues that there is an increasing
role for private actors within the WTO through the dispute settlement process, particularly
when compared to the mechanisms in other international institutions.82 WTO panels and the
Appellate Body have the discretion, although they are not obliged, to accept amicus curiae
briefs from non-state actors. They have done so on many occasions,83 and as was discussed
above, there has been a recent trend towards opening panel and Appellate Body hearings to
the public.84 The first public hearing of the Appellate Body occurred in July 2008 in the EC
— Hormones dispute, where the disputing parties (the EC, U.S., and Canada) requested that
the hearing be open to the public (although some third parties’ submissions were not able to
be viewed by the public, at the request of those parties).85 While this new openness and
transparency in dispute settlement sets positive and important precedents for global
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governance, it is still a long way from ensuring avenues for non-state actors to participate in
and scrutinize all WTO decision-making.
Democratic theory, when applied to international institutions, assumes that private actors,
such as individuals or corporations, are able to be involved in decision-making processes
through their national governments. Yet there is no guarantee that this will occur. For
example, there is no requirement of procedural fairness or due process imposed by the WTO
on the involvement of national officials in transnational regulatory negotiations, such as the
regular and often ongoing negotiations that take place within the WTO.86 Domestic laws
determine the requirements that a national official is subject to when negotiating on behalf
of their country. While the failure of a national official to adequately consult with their
relevant domestic constituents is a failing of national democracy, it also affects the
democratic legitimacy of the transnational regulations. If the representatives of each state are
not adequately representing their citizens, then the end result of those negotiations will
likewise not adequately represent the needs and wants of those citizens. In many
circumstances, national laws do not require that the state’s representatives at international
negotiations act with procedural fairness. For example, in the U.S., a non-profit public
interest organization87 unsuccessfully sought a declaration from the Court of Appeal (District
of Colombia Circuit) that the United States Trade Representative (USTR) was under an
obligation to prepare an environmental impact statement addressing international trade
agreements under negotiation.88 The need for the preparation of such a statement for public
consultation and procedural fairness was subsequently acknowledged by Executive Order
13,141, under which the President mandated that an environmental review be conducted and
related in both draft form enabling public comment, and in final form.89 This represents the
imposition of administrative law-type procedures on the participation of the USTR in global
negotiations, but only in one case with no guarantee that future negotiators will be subject
to the same procedures.90 Generalizing the requirement that negotiators are subject to the
obligations of procedural fairness would create a situation in which citizens in each of the
states represented in negotiations would enjoy a degree of de facto participation in the
decision-making process. The degree of such participation would depend on the extent that
citizens could effectively influence the negotiating position of their respective representative
through domestic mechanisms for political accountability. However, despite the desirability
of such an approach, at present it is limited to a collection of isolated examples.91
The principle of sovereign equality has another shortcoming in terms of democratic
theory. It presumes that all states have an equal ability to negotiate and bargain in
international negotiations. Article XVI(5) of the Marrakesh Agreement prevents members
from making any reservations from the WTO Agreements, except as expressly permitted in
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those Agreements, thereby establishing the “single-undertaking.”92 The result of this is that
if a country wishes to gain any of the benefits of WTO membership, they must accept all of
the obligations that come along with that. While this may not sound problematic, it must be
considered that the WTO Agreements cover an incredibly broad range of subject matter, such
as phytosanitary regulations, intellectual property laws, technical standards and regulations,
and customs procedures. Given the huge economic importance of gaining WTO membership
for many developing countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), often these nations
will accept undesired conditions of membership that they would not accept if they had more
equal bargaining power or the ability to make reservations. Thus, the single-undertaking
principle, along with the process of negotiated accession to the WTO, establishes a system
where states with little bargaining power have a limited ability to consent to various terms
or agreements. Again, this raises significant questions about the operation of democratic
principles in the WTO.93
However, even if it is accepted that all WTO members fully consent to all elements of
each WTO Agreement, this still has implications in terms of democratic deficit. The principle
of consensus that underpins negotiated decision-making in the WTO is intended to remove
many of these concerns about states being bound by laws or rules that they did not consent
to. The principle of consensus is perhaps the ultimate means of preventing the tyranny of the
majority, as any single state has the theoretical ability to stop an agreement being formed.
But this of course has very serious implications for the efficacy of WTO negotiations and
decision-making. This also has negative implications for democracy. The inability of the
WTO to adopt policies that the majority of members may support, such as agricultural
liberalization, means that the majority cannot prevail, and instead a minority viewpoint
“rules.” Moreover, Lamy himself admits that this system of consensus makes the WTO
institutionally weak,94 and this weakness undermines the “efficiency” of the WTO, a
characteristic that he argues is needed in any model of “‘good’ global governance.”95
B. DEMOCRACIES AND COMPLIANCE WITH WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
1. DOES COMPLIANCE WITH WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT WITHIN DEMOCRATIC
 NATIONS UNDERMINE DEMOCRATIC WILL WITHIN THOSE NATIONS?
In relation to decision-making, this article has considered whether mechanisms within the
WTO are consistent with democratic theory. Yet this is not the only way in which the WTO
interacts with democratic theory. Compliance with decisions of the WTO dispute settlement
system can impact upon the domestic democratic systems of members. What does a member
do when a decision of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) requires them to act in a way that
violates their domestic democratic legal system or principles? Furthermore, do democratic
systems within some member states, in turn, undermine the dispute settlement system of the
WTO?
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For the majority of WTO members, WTO law and decisions of the DSB do not have direct
legal effect. In other words, they must be implemented by the domestic government. Thus,
the WTO does not have the power to compel private entities within a state to act, yet often
compliance with the WTO Agreements has a direct impact on these private actors. One of
the clearest examples of this is in relation to cases where it is found that a subsidy has been
or is being provided by a member in violation of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.96 In the Brazil — Export Programme for Aircraft dispute, the
Appellate Body held that domestic law and contractual obligations cannot be used to justify
the failure to withdraw an export subsidy.97 Similarly, in the Australia — Subsidies Provided
to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather dispute, the Compliance Panel held that
a non-recurring subsidy that had been provided to a private company had to be repaid in full
to the Australian government, even though no domestic legal basis existed to compel the
company to repay the subsidy as under domestic law the subsidy had been legally granted.98
Thus, compliance with WTO dispute settlement decisions may require violations of domestic
law and legal principles. Moreover, even where compliance does not involve infringement
of the legal rights of private parties, any shift in national policy in a democratic state that is
compelled by an external body, such as the WTO, challenges the democratic foundations of
that state. However, assuming that the decision to accede to the WTO was initially made by
democratically elected representatives, complying with an unpopular WTO ruling is not
necessarily undemocratic. Rather, members are simply being held to follow rules that their
governments agreed to uphold. Further, members could always leave the WTO if their
citizens formed the view that the costs of adverse rulings outweighed the benefits of
membership.
2. DOES POPULAR WILL WITHIN DEMOCRATIC NATIONS UNDERMINE 
COMPLIANCE WITH WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, AND HENCE THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE?
The preceding section assumed that democratic states always comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the WTO DSB.99 But, as has just been mentioned, often the
will of the people (or the will of significant political actors) within these states may go
against these recommendations and rulings. In this way, democratic will at the national level
can work to undermine the effectiveness of international law. As noted above, it is a general
precept of international law that domestic law cannot be used as an excuse for failure to meet
international obligations. Within the WTO, the DSU requires that all members comply with
rulings made against them, regardless of their domestic obligations. This could be seen to
contribute to the development of global governance by putting international law on a level
that transcends national concerns and political considerations.
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Within the WTO, a party that wins a dispute may retaliate under art. 22 of the DSU if the
losing party does not bring their measure into compliance with the relevant WTO Agreement
within a reasonable period of time. However, in some circumstances, the threat of retaliation
or cross-retaliation is simply not enough to induce compliance. This has been the case most
notably in disputes concerning two of the most significant (and democratic) WTO members
– the U.S. and the EC. In the EC – Hormones dispute, the Appellate Body report finding that
the EC measure was in violation of the WTO Agreements was adopted by the DSB in
February 1998. Yet it was not until November 2003 that the EC notified the DSB that it had
altered its measure to comply with the Appellate Body decision and, even then, its attempt
to comply with the report is currently being challenged by the U.S. and Canada. Similarly,
in the European Communites — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas dispute, the initial request for consultations was made on 5 February 1996, and the
Appellate Body report was circulated on 9 September 1997.100 Yet since that date, the EC has
still failed to comply with the rulings of the Appellate Body concerning the import of
bananas and preferences given to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries.
In each of these cases, there are powerful and long-standing political views within the EC
that supported the inconsistent measures. Consumer and environmental lobby group pressure
was a significant reason for the ongoing ban on hormone-treated meat being sold in Europe.
The lobby groups launched extensive anti-hormone-treated meat media campaigns, which
helped to create a strong public sentiment in favour of hormone free products.101 When the
European Commission suggested that it might lift the ban on a small range of hormones in
1995, the European Parliament (where consumer and environmental lobby groups enjoy
considerable influence) strongly resisted this move, and ultimately the Commission backed
down.102 Many of these same consumer groups support the continued blanket ban on
hormone-treated meat in the EU, even though such a ban has been found to be inconsistent
with WTO obligations.103
These cases demonstrate that while the DSU, in theory, forces members to comply with
its rulings regardless of their domestic considerations and obligations, in practice this has not
always been effective. This of course does mean that the WTO has been a failure in this
regard. These examples are the exception, not the rule. The experience of the WTO, where
generally members do comply with dispute settlement rulings, makes an important
contribution to global governance by demonstrating how systems can be set up to induce
compliance with international rules and obligations. However, these exceptional cases also
demonstrate that the WTO system is not perfect, and that perhaps stronger enforcement
mechanisms need to be considered. It is therefore not only true that global governance may
at times undermine democracy; democracy may also undermine global governance.
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IV.  CONCLUSION
Contrary to popular perceptions, the WTO has clearly made an important contribution to
global governance, although it is more understated and nuanced than some of its proponents
might suggest. While the WTO does incorporate administrative law principles both within
its own dispute settlement system and, to a more limited degree, by imposing them on its
members, the application of these principles is subject to significant constraints. Decision-
making is broadly democratic, but particular WTO rules, processes, and decision-making
structures could be considered undemocratic in that they affect, and in some cases override,
the domestic administrative decision-making processes of members. In other words, a tension
exists between the WTO’s substantive contributions to global governance through its
regulatory functions, and the impact of such contributions on democracy and procedural
justice — themselves important aspects of global governance.
